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Abstract 
 
This paper starts out from the optimistic assumption that the basic policies for 
environmental economic development are known but uncertainties surround the speed 
of their adoption. In many developing countries the key obstacle is poor governance: 
consequently, renewable resources continue to be mined, non-renewable resources 
are depleted irresponsibly, and reductions in pollution intensity lag. Recent research 
identifies resource abundance as an important cause of policy failure. This is because 
the primary sector remains large in relation to GDP so that differences in the scale of 
natural resource rents (and in their socio-economic linkages) condition macro policy in 
important ways. Most developing countries are resource-rich, a condition that 
engenders predatory political states that deploy resource rents in ways that 
cumulatively distort the economy so it falls into a staple trap, which undermines 
economic growth and environmentally sustainable policies. Sound macroeconomic 
policy is critical to the success of microeconomic measures like much of environmental 
policy, a fact often neglected by environmental reformers. There are two implications of 
this. First, in the long term, improved governance will enhance environmentally 
sustainable management of: renewable resources (by taking account of the total 
economic value of resources); finite resources (guided by the need to maintain genuine 
saving); and the global pollution sinks (by flattening the environmental Kuznets curve). 
Second, until such improvements occur, environmental policies are likely to under-
perform unless they are adapted to take account of flawed macro policies. 
Environmental reformers therefore need to support efforts by the international financial 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper starts from the optimistic premise that the basic economic policies for 
sustainable development are known and that it is policy implementation that raises 
most controversy. In the advanced (knowledge) economies the controversy revolves 
around the speed of the response to environmental issues, because the faster and 
more abrupt the response, the greater the costs that the present generation must 
bear. The dispute is rooted in uncertainty about the capacity of technology to resolve 
future environmental problems (Birdsall and Steers 1993) and also in ethical 
concerns regarding inter-generational obligations. In contrast, the principal obstacle 
to environmentally sustainable policies in the developing countries is that of 
government failure to promote economic and environmental policies that have clearly 
established benefits.  
 
This paper is concerned with the obstacles to sustainable development in the 
developing countries. It identifies the mismanagement of natural resource 
abundance as a key cause of macroeconomic policy failure, which adversely affects 
all aspects of micro policy, including environmental policy. It goes on to suggest that 
many analyses of environmental problems in the developing countries neglect how 
macroeconomic failure affects policies that are implemented at the micro level, and 
as a consequence such analyses risk misdiagnosing the effectiveness of those 
policies and the reforms required. 
 
There is increasing evidence that because the primary sector remains important in 
low income countries, the scale of the natural resource rents and the socio-economic 
linkages that they generate affect the aims of the government and the development 
trajectory of the economy in important ways (Sachs and Warner 1995a and 1995b, 
Karl 1997, Ascher 1999, Ross 1999, Auty 2001). In particular, since the 1960s the 
resource-poor countries have tended to spawn developmental political states that 
pursued a trajectory of competitive industrialisation characterised by high and rising 
genuine saving rates, which indicate strong economic and environmental 
sustainability. Those same countries have tended to strengthen their social capital, 
formal institutions and political accountability, so that their development policies are 
also becoming socially more sustainable (Woolcock et al. 2001). In contrast, natural 
resource abundance has been associated with predatory political states that distort 
their economies so that the development trajectory is one that becomes locked in a 
staple trap of increasing dependence on a primary sector with diminishing 
competitiveness. Such economies are vulnerable to a growth collapse that causes all 
forms of capital, including social capital, to run down, and from which recovery has 
proved to be protracted and may take generations. There are, however, sufficient 
anomalies among the resource-abundant countries (including Botswana, Chile, pre-
1997 Indonesia and Malaysia) to suggest that this outcome is not a deterministic 
one. 
 
This paper explains how differences in the natural resource endowment affect policy 
in the developing countries and spells out the implications for improvements in 
environmental policy and sustainable development. The paper is structured as 
follows. The next section, section two, sets out the basic macro- and microeconomic 
policy requirements for environmentally sustainable development. Section three 
demonstrates how natural resource abundance can undermine these requirements 2   
by adversely conditioning government aims. The next three sections then explain the 
consequences of macro policy failure, and offer solutions, for each of the three 
principal sets of natural resources, namely renewable (section four), fund (section 
five) and the pollution sinks (section six). The conclusion summarises the argument 
and draws the main policy implications.  
 
 
2.  Basic Macro and Micro Policies for Sustainable Resource 
Management 
 
Post-war development policies experienced a sharp discontinuity around 1980, when 
the international financial institutions (IFIs) spearheaded efforts to reduce the role of 
government and refocus it. During the first three decades after the Second World 
War many developing countries increased their commitment to forced 
industrialisation and cumulatively distorted their economies, resembling the centrally 
planned economies in that respect (Auty and Mikesell 1998). Forced industrialisation 
grew out of the sharp contraction of the world trade system in the 1930s and 1940s. 
It spawned a growing controversy among development economists with respect to 
the contribution of primary commodity exports to growth. Structuralists like Prebisch 
(1964) projected a downward trend in the terms of trade for primary commodities in 
relation to manufactured goods imported by the developing countries. He argued that 
any increase in productivity in primary commodity production accrues to 
industrialised countries, whereas productivity increases in industrial countries result 
in higher wages and profits in those countries rather than a decrease in the prices of 
manufactures imported by the developing countries. Therefore, he concluded that 
the developing countries should accelerate industrialisation by protecting 'infant' 
industry geared to supplying the domestic market. The structuralist economists 
favoured planning and the non-market allocation of resources achieved through a 
variety of controls and also government incentives for domestic investment, prices, 
and foreign trade. This approach tended to dominate development theory during the 
decades 1950 to1980.  
 
The structuralist ideas were opposed by mainstream economists such as Bauer and 
Yamey (1957) and MacBean (1966) who accepted the doctrine of comparative 
advantage, and argued that primary commodity exports are the only way that 
countries in the early stages of development can generate the foreign exchange 
necessary to pay for essential imports and to service external debt. Also, an 
expansion of trade attracts foreign investment and the transfer of modern 
technology. Growth is therefore maximised by maintaining free internal and external 
markets for goods, and by allocating capital in free capital markets.  
 
A basic weakness in the case made by the structuralists and development planners 
is that it underestimated the capacity of developing country governments to 
misallocate resources and impair both domestic and foreign investment (Lal 1983). 
With the benefit of hindsight, the unexpectedly high risk of policy failure suggests 
that developing country governments should confine their effort to creating an 
enabling environment, focusing their economic activities on fiscal, monetary and 
exchange rate policies for stabilising domestic prices and preventing balance of 
payments disequilibria. However, they should also intervene to correct market failure 
arising either from the inability of investors to capture the full gains of their 3   
investment, as in large-scale infrastructure investments and education, or the failure 
of producers to absorb the full costs of their activity, as with the environment. This 
argument gained strong support as a result of growth collapses in the more distorted 
developing countries during the 1970s and the phenomenal growth of the East Asian 
newly industrialised countries, which followed relatively liberal economic policies, 
although their governments did intervene to encourage investment in emerging 
comparative advantage (Sachs 1985).  
 
The, unjustly, much-maligned Washington consensus (Williamson 1996, 14-15) 
provides a useful summary of the basic policy measures required to achieve an 
enabling environment. Briefly, it argues that governments need to:  
 
  maintain fiscal discipline by broadly matching public expenditure to a healthily 
diversified tax base; 
  direct public expenditure away from administration, defence, ad hoc subsidies 
and white elephant mega-projects towards neglected areas offering high 
returns, notably those that improve asset distribution such as education, 
health and social infrastructure; 
  secure property rights without excessive costs, including rights for the informal 
sector; 
  maintain a competitive exchange rate and remove domestic price distortions, 
including subsidies that encourage wasteful over-consumption; 
  promote competitive markets, including efficient financial markets that 
facilitate entry by domestic and foreign firms and enhance the efficient 
allocation of investment. 
 
During the 1990s, some movement occurred in favour of placing more direct 
emphasis on poverty alleviation by, for example, pro-poor asset redistribution and 
targeting public transfers more tightly towards those in need (Williamson 1996, 18).  
 
The creation of an enabling economic environment should align a country's 
investment with its underlying comparative advantage, thereby improving the use of 
scarce capital and human resources so that economic growth rates recover. Rapid 
economic growth with open trade encourages the adoption of new technology, which 
seeks to improve resource use efficiency and to curb pollution (Birdsall and Wheeler 
1992). This process is helped by the removal of domestic price distortions such as 
subsidies that encourage the wasteful consumption of energy, fertiliser and irrigation 
water. In addition, the negative externality costs that arise from air and water 
pollution, can be reduced by incorporating the cost of damage to health and the 
environment into prices through appropriate economic instruments (such as taxes, 
charges or marketable permits) or, usually as a second best solution, by emission 
targets managed by government command-and-control.  
 
Developing countries have much to lose by waiting for their incomes to rise before 
curbing environmental damage and the wasteful use of natural resources. It is the 
basic thesis of this paper that environmental policies can be adopted earlier and 
more effectively if environmental policy makers are more informed about the capacity 
of governments to sustain sound macro and micro policies, including environmental 
policies. A prerequisite for this improvement in performance is an understanding of 
the causes of policy failure in low-income countries. 4   
3.  Natural Resources, the Political State and Policy Failure 
 
An abundance of natural resources should accelerate economic development 
because it increases exports so that more capital goods can be imported to build up 
the economy, and also because the natural resource rents (returns in excess of 
those required by an efficient producer) can be used to boost capital investment. 
This, along with the capacity to benefit from the redeployment of labour into more 
productive activity and the closure of the technology gap with the knowledge 
economies, creates the conditions for rapid convergence in per capita incomes. 
Indeed, some countries, most of them resource-poor and including China since 1978 
and more recently India, and comprising 54 per cent of the developing country 
population (World Bank 2002), have been doing that. However, the resource-rich 
countries, which predominate in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab 
world, although less populous, are more numerous and many of them have fallen 
behind.  
 
In fact, since the mid-1980s per capita income growth in the developing countries 
has been inversely related to the share of natural resource rents in GDP (Table 1). 
The mineral-driven economies had the highest rents, and the weakest economic 
growth: nature's gift of natural resource abundance has been a curse rather than a 
blessing (Gelb and Associates 1988). There are two main reasons for the superior 
performance of the resource-poor countries in recent decades. The first is that they 
have been more likely than resource-rich countries to foster developmental political 
states that possess both the autonomy to pursue coherent policies and the aim of 
raising the welfare of the entire population. The second reason is that resource-poor 
countries diversify their economies earlier than the resource-rich countries into 
competitive manufacturing and this brings high, and more importantly, efficient, 
investment.  
 
These outcomes can be distilled into two contrasting models: the competitive 
industrialisation model and the staple trap model (Auty and Gelb 2001). The 
competitive industrialisation model is associated with resource-poor countries and 
developmental political states whereas the staple trap model is linked to resource 
abundance and predatory political states. More specifically, developmental political 
states have been associated with resource-poor countries because the absence of 
rents gives their governments a stronger incentive than their resource-rich 
counterparts to generate wealth by providing public goods and promoting efficient 
investment rather than by capturing natural resource rents. In addition, limited scope 
for primary product exports causes resource-poor countries to commence 
competitive industrialisation at a low level of per capita income. Much of the 
manufacturing is for export and low wages result in it initially being labour-intensive. 
The combination of a developmental political state with an early start on competitive 
labour-intensive industrialisation triggers virtuous interlocking economic and social 
circles that sustain rapid and equitable economic growth. The experience of 
resource-poor countries as diverse as South Korea, Hong Kong and Mauritius is 
summarised by the competitive industrialisation model. 
 
The virtuous economic cycle of the competitive industrialisation model is rooted in 
the resource-poor countries' early start on industrialisation, which accelerates their 
rate of urbanisation. This, in turn, speeds passage through the demographic cycle so 5   
that population growth slows and the number of dependants (children and 
pensioners) that each worker supports falls. This increases the rate of saving and 
investment, pushing the latter above 25 per cent of GDP (Table 2). Moreover, 
exposure to global competition helps to sustain the efficiency of domestic investment 
so that economic growth is rapid and per capita GDP can double each decade. In 
addition, manufacturing is initially labour-intensive and rapidly absorbs surplus rural 
labour so that labour shortages create pressure for wage increases. This prompts 
diversification into more skill-intensive and capital-intensive industry that can pay an 
increasingly expensive workforce by making the workers more productive. The 
resulting competitive economic diversification strengthens the economy's resilience 
to shocks.  
 
The virtuous social cycle is based on the fact that the labour shortages put a floor 
under the wages of the poor, while the rapid accumulation of skills puts a ceiling on 
the skill premium, which gives a relatively equitable income distribution. Meanwhile, 
early urbanisation creates a hierarchy of markets that not only facilitates trade but 
also dilutes the anti-innovation effect of bonding (local) social capital by extending 
social networks out to the regional and national level. The combination of equitable 
income distribution and strengthening social capital fosters trust, which lowers 
transaction costs and further boosts investment efficiency. As noted below in section 
five, the resource-poor countries tend to have rising positive genuine saving rates, 
which indicate strong sustainability.  
 
In contrast, the disappointing development since the 1970s of many (but not all) 
countries in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world is linked to the 
fact that most are resource-rich and their development trajectories tend to follow the 
staple trap model. Natural resources allow governments to win political support by 
capturing and distributing the rents, so they neglect wealth creation. In this way, a 
longer reliance on primary product exports engenders predatory political states 
rather than developmental ones. It also delays competitive industrialisation so that 
urbanisation is retarded, the demographic cycle is delayed and each worker must 
support more dependants. The rate of saving therefore increases more slowly than 
in resource-poor countries. Meanwhile, the lag in labour-intensive manufactured 
exports causes surplus labour to persist in rural areas, while skills accumulate more 
slowly. This heightens income inequality and social tensions. 
 
Fears of unemployment cause resource-rich governments to deploy the rents to 
force industrialisation or to expand government services, both of which tend to use 
labour and capital inefficiently. A protected sector of industry and bureaucracy 
grows, forcing the government to squeeze more and more rent from farms and 
mines to support it. These transfers eventually outstrip the natural resource rents 
and absorb the return to capital, destroying incentives for efficient investment within 
the primary sector. In this way, the resource-abundant economy becomes locked 
into a staple trap in which parasitic protected industry and an over-expanded 
bureaucracy siphon revenue from a primary sector whose competitiveness and 
relative size both wane as government policies blunt incentives. The result is a 
weakened economy that is vulnerable to a growth collapse. The price shocks of the 
1970s triggered growth collapses in most resource-rich countries (Table 1), whether 
large like Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria and the Philippines or small, ranging down from 
Venezuela through Zambia to Papua New Guinea.  6   
Fortunately, the relationship between natural resource rents and type of political 
state is not a deterministic one. A handful of resource-abundant countries spanning 
quite different cultures and including Botswana, Chile, Indonesia and Malaysia 
spawned developmental political states. In such cases, the longer reliance on 
primary products merely postpones competitive industrialisation. The key to 
successful development therefore lies in discouraging predatory political states by 
strengthening sanctions against anti-social governance so that coherent economic 
policies can be pursued that sustain rising incomes and curb environmental damage. 
The next three sections review these policies for each of the three principal 




4.  Managing Renewable Resources 
 
This section surveys the optimistic views of many mainstream economists about socio-
economic adjustment to increasing demands on renewable resources. It notes their 
neglect of the risks of government and market failure in developing countries, examples 
of which are presented for farming and rain forest management. Finally, it advances the 
concept of total economic value as a useful tool for correcting resource 
mismanagement.  
 
Boserup (1965) argues that increasing population pressure on land will be self-
correcting because an initial fall in living standards causes farmers to seek to regain 
their earlier lifestyle by making social and technical changes to systems that may have 
lasted centuries. Change then becomes inbuilt to the system so that fallow periods in 
shifting cultivation are steadily shortened, eventually giving way to sedentary rain-fed 
farming, with appropriate adjustments to soil types. Further population pressure may 
subsequently be met by recourse to irrigation, which raises yields by improving control 
over the timing of farm operations. Thereafter, green revolution techniques applied to 
irrigated farming systems intensify yields still further while concerns for over-use of 
chemical fertilisers and pesticides encourage recourse to biological substitutes (Bray 
1994).  
 
As an example, Tiffen and Mortimore (1994) report the recovery of production on land 
in Machakos, Kenya that was already degraded by population pressure in the 1930s. 
The key was land use change so that instead of each farm growing a range of 
subsistence crops irrespective of physical conditions, farmers specialised and matched 
their crops to slope and soil. A critical component in such stories of successful 
agricultural adaptation is access to markets to allow crop specialisation (Goldman 
1993). Where markets are repressed or missing, as under excessive intervention by a 
predatory government or following a growth collapse, farmers become trapped in 
subsistence with insufficient land resources. The threat of starvation shortens time 
horizons and leads to the unsustainable management of natural resources. The 
capacity of the government to manage the economy in a way that facilitates the division 
of labour is therefore critical (Lipton 1997).  
 
It is possible to conceive of a variant on the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) in 
which pressure on land resources first intensifies and then eases as per capita incomes 
rise (Scherr 1997). Within such a land EKC the agricultural frontier first expands until 7   
land scarcity encourages substitution of land, first by labour, and later increasingly by 
capital (Binswanger and Pingali 1987). As income levels rise further, population growth 
slows and demand for agricultural products slows with it. However, cropping continues 
to intensify so that land is increasingly released for recreational and conservation uses 
(Mitchell 1997, 50-51; Lofdhal 2002, 95). This self-correcting sequence will be aborted, 
however, so that soil degradation will occur if maladroit macroeconomic policies fail to 
improve rural infrastructure, or to generate sufficient jobs in non-farm employment to 
absorb surplus rural labour and curb population growth, or to earn sufficient foreign 
exchange to maintain supplies of essential farm inputs.  
 
The cumulative distortion and collapse of the economies of many resource-rich 
countries through the 1960s and 1970s furnishes examples of agricultural regression. 
Revenue extraction from agriculture was especially damaging in sub-Saharan Africa: 
Krueger (1993) found that direct agricultural taxation there averaged 25 per cent of 
crop revenues, some four times that of Latin America and ten times that of Asia. The 
figure for sub-Saharan Africa doubles when indirect taxes, such as overvalued 
exchange rates, are added. Such maladroit policies pushed farmers back into 
subsistence. For example, in order to subsidise urban workers, the Ethiopian 
government drastically cut farm revenue by a combination of under-pricing domestic 
food purchases and overvaluing the exchange rate to reduce the cost of imported food. 
This triggered a vicious downward spiral as returns to farming fell and men migrated to 
the city in search of jobs. This migration simultaneously increased the work burden on 
rural women and children and raised the demand for urban fuel. Unable to pay higher 
prices for imported oil-based fuels, the poorer urban groups turned to local fuel 
supplies. Farmers then found it more profitable to sell crop residue and dung for urban 
fuel than to use it to replenish the soil. However, this caused crop yields to deteriorate 
in a vicious circle of rural impoverishment and environmental degradation (Newcombe 
1989).  
 
In the absence of a competent government, environmental policies need to be adapted 
to minimise the damage arising from macroeconomic failure. For example, the World 
Resources Institute (WRI) (1987, 235) identifies simple measures such as contour 
ridges and alley cropping that can be undertaken by local people to maintain natural 
resources and boost output without reliance on the national government. In this 
context, the recent fashion for 'bottom-up' land use programmes may be a response to 
macro policy failure rather than to systemic flaws in 'top-down' development. If this is 
so, environmental planners should recognise that 'bottom-up' policies will also be 
damaged if farmers become too dependent on assistance from a failing political state. 
Meanwhile, the WRI suggests that the scope for improved farming practices can 
eventually be expanded when successful economic reform eliminates overvalued 
exchange rates and price distortions, like urban food subsidies.  The ultimate 'bottom-
up' strategy is to nurture effective markets that provide farmers with the information 
they require to make the most effective use of whatever land, labour and financial 
resources they can command.  
 
Rainforests provide a second important example of how government failure and 
market failure can turn renewable resources into finite ones. Binswanger (1991) 
estimates that a hectare of Amazon forest is capable of generating $7,000/yr 
revenue under its natural state, but only $3,000 in degraded form. He concludes that 
this is brought about by a combination of three factors; maladroit macroeconomic 8   
policy, market failure and micro policies that convert socially unprofitable land uses 
into privately profitable ones. The failure of successive Brazilian governments to 
reform the faltering forced industrialisation development strategy or to redistribute 
land in eastern Brazil led successive governments to turn to the Amazon for 
solutions (Auty 1994). In order to offset flagging foreign exchange earnings, the 
government borrowed recycled petrodollars to invest in resource-based projects in 
the Amazon like the Gran Carajas iron ore mine. However, improved transport links 
opened up intervening opportunities for settlement of new tracts by both small 
farmers and large ranchers unfamiliar with tropical rainforest environments.  
 
More specifically, macro mismanagement led to chronic inflation in Brazil of 900 to 
2,000 per cent from the late 1970s that encouraged wealthier groups to invest in land 
as an inflation hedge. Micro measures reinforced the returns to such speculation by 
offering tax credits for up to 75 per cent of cash invested in Amazon projects and 
subsidised loans for purchasing farm inputs. Tax exemptions on farming also 
encouraged businessmen to evade taxation by buying land and mis-declaring 
income from urban business as farm income. These measures were a regressive 
subsidy from all taxpayers to the rich to remove the forest and replace it with pasture 
that rapidly lost its nutrition. Small farmers also secured perverse incentives from the 
government. Small farmers from the east were encouraged to sell their land to 
businessmen (who could make a higher return using it as a tax shelter) and migrate 
to the Amazon, an environment that away from the valley bottoms proves hostile to 
agriculture. However, the newly arrived squatters secured usage rights for public 
land after one year of occupation and ownership rights after five years. Farmers had 
an incentive to clear the land to evade taxation because taxes were levied at a 
higher rate on 'unimproved' farm holdings than on cultivated land. 
 
In addition to government failure, market failure also biases incentives against 
conservation. It does so by preventing forest owners from capturing the financial 
returns on the various environmental services that are provided by the forest such as 
soil erosion control, flood prevention, biodiversity and carbon sequestration. A 
rationale for forest exploitation is provided by the concept of total economic value 
(TEV), which identifies the worth of conservation benefits. The latter comprise direct 
use value (sustainable timber plus non-timber products, medicinal value and recreation 
benefits), indirect use value (nutrient recycling, watershed protection, air pollution 
reduction and preservation of local micro-climates), the option value of forgoing present 
uses in order to keep future options open and existence value (the satisfaction of 
knowing the forest exists even if the recipient never uses it). Correction of market 
failures should mean that forest removal only occurs if the benefits from development 
exceed the costs of such development plus the net benefits of conservation foregone 
(i.e. conservation benefits as identified by TEV, minus conservation costs). 
 
Direct value is the easiest component of TEV to determine because markets already 
exist for such services. However, various techniques allow the estimation of indirect, 
option and existence values, and ways are also increasingly being found to capture the 
revenues. For example, Nordhaus (1994) calculates global warming damage at 
$13/tonne of CO2 in 1989 prices so if emissions from forest burning are 100 tonnes/ha, 
then the pollution cost per hectare of forest burned is $1,300. Afforestation is estimated 
to absorb carbon at the rate of 10 tonnes/ha of rainforest, which gives a value to such 
practices of $130 per hectare. Markets are now beginning to emerge for carbon 9   
sequestration that allow industrial polluters to pay farmers and foresters to follow land 
use practices that offset their pollution.  
 
A further example of correcting market failure is provided with regard to existence 
value, which is measured by 'willingness to pay' studies (contingent valuation).  For 
example, Pearce (1996) estimates from surveys that each member of the 400 million-
strong global middle class would pay $8 per year for the existence value of rainforest 
conservation. That would generate $3.2 billion annually, some 25 per cent of 
Amazonian GDP, which could be made available to compensate local people for 
foregoing exploitive activity. The emergence of such missing markets based on mutual 




5.  Managing Finite Resources 
 
Mainstream economists consider that sustainable development based upon the 
exploitation of finite mineral resources is feasible, despite the apparent contradiction, 
provided there are practical substitutes for the depleting natural asset. The critical 
assumption is that sustainability does not require that the natural resource be passed 
on to future generations. After all, the natural resource may be rendered worthless by 
the discovery of superior resources elsewhere or technological substitutes. Rather, 
sustainability requires that the capacity to sustain the income stream from the mineral 
asset needs to be passed on to future generations. This calls for the income generating 
capacity of the depleted mineral to be replaced with alternative wealth-generating 
assets (for example, factories or an educated workforce). 
 
At the local  level, sustainability requires communities to avoid increasing their 
dependence on subsidies from the mining sector. Rather, a fraction of the mine 
receipts should be set aside to provide alternative employment opportunities for the 
community when mining ceases, and also to restore the environment as close as 
possible to its pre-mined state, consistent with the benefits of restoration not exceeding 
the costs (Auty and Mikesell 1998). Yet at the national level matters are not so simple, 
as shown by the fact that in recent years the mineral economies have performed least 
well of all the six categories of resource endowment in Table 1. The difficulty arises out 
of two features of mining. First, it tends to generate mineral rents that are large relative 
to GDP (Table 1). Second, the socio-economic linkages arising from the capital-
intensive production function of mining concentrate the natural resource rents on 
taxation and therefore on the government. These two features intensify the risk of 
government and policy failure through over-rapid domestic absorption of the mineral 
rents whereas more diffuse socio-economic linkages such as those for peasant cash 
crops, tend to absorb the rents more slowly because the rents are spread across a 
wider range of economic agents that display a greater propensity to save than 
governments do (Bevan et al. 1997).   
 
Here again, strengthened sanctions against anti-social governance will improve the 
quality of governance, but environmental and natural resource accounting (EARA) can 
also help by providing a rationale for sustainable deployment of the mineral rents. 
EARA recognises that the GNP identity of the standard national accounts (SNA) 
overstates investment and output because each year some produced (man-made) 10   
capital is scrapped (depreciated). This is only partially corrected in the SNA by 
calculating the net national product (NNP), which equals GNP minus the annual 
depreciation of produced (man-made) capital. EARA takes this process further. It does 
so by first accounting for the depletion of finite resources like minerals, to generate 
ENP1, and then deducting the cost of damage done to environmental services (such as 
natural pollution absorption capacity), which gives ENP2. The process can be further 
elaborated by, for example, accounting for changes in the human capital stock (the net 
effect of educational expenditure) to give the expression:  
 
ENP2 = GNP - Dp - Dr - De + E    (1) 
 
           where: ENP2 = environmental national product adjusted for depletion of finite 
and environmental resources 
    GNP = gross national product 
  D p = depreciation of produced assets 
  D r = depletion of finite natural resource assets 
  D e = depletion of environmental assets  
    E  = net increase in education 
 
The most commonly used measure of finite natural resource depletion is the net price, 
which calculates the annual depletion coefficient as the total rent (revenue minus all 
costs of production of an efficient world producer including a risk-related return on 
investment). However, the net price method tends to overstate the depletion coefficient 
because convenience usually dictates that the average cost is used rather than the 
marginal cost. An alternative measure of the depletion coefficient is the 'user cost' that 
divides the rent into two components: an income component, which can be consumed 
by the present generation, and a capital component, which must be saved and invested 
for future generations. The capital component of the rent is defined as the sum invested 
annually to yield sufficient income to replace the mining income when mining ends. For 
example, if it is assumed that the rent averages £250,000 per year, the interest rate is 
10 per cent and the life of the mine is 20 years, then the annual depletion component is 
£37,000 and the income component is £213,000. This is because £37,000 when saved 
and compounded each year at 10 per cent interest over the 20-year life of the mine 
yields the sum of £2.13 million. This sum, at 10 per cent interest, gives an annual 
income of £213,000 in perpetuity, equivalent to the annual income during the working 
life of the mine. 
 
There is also no consensus on how to measure the extent and cost of the damage 
done to the environment, in order to estimate ENP2. The adjustment is usually based 
on the production foregone from polluted farmland and/or the cost of illnesses and of 
damage caused to buildings by emissions. Van Tongeren et al. (1991) estimate ENP2 
for Mexico in 1985. They calculate ENP1 as 94 per cent of NNP, after deducting 6 per 
cent of GNP for the value of annual oil depletion and then estimate ENP2 as only 87 
per cent of NNP after deducting a further 7 per cent of GNP for the cost of 
environmental damage (based on the estimated cost of water, air and land pollution). 
The resulting adjustment to derive ENP2 cuts the level of net investment to -2 per cent 
of GNP, implying that the Mexican economy in 1985 consumed more capital than it 
invested and was therefore not on a sustainable path.  
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Such calculations have given rise to the concept of genuine saving, which some 
economists claim as the first available index of the sustainability of an economy. 
Pearce et al. (1996) argue that for development to be sustainable, ENP2 must not be 
declining over time. They identify the rate of genuine saving as the critical index of 
sustainability and define genuine saving as: 
 
GS = GNP - C - G - Dp - Dr - De + E     (2) 
 
          where:  GS = genuine saving 
    C  = private consumption 
    G  = government consumption 
  GNP,  Dp , Dr , De  and E carry the same definitions as (1) above  
 
For sustainability, the genuine saving rate must be greater than or equal to the sum of 
the depreciation of produced capital minus the depletion of finite natural capital minus 
the degradation of environmental capital. World Bank data for 1970-94 suggests that 
the newly industrialising countries have high and rising genuine saving coefficients of 
between 20 and 30 per cent of GNP (Table 3). This reflects the very high rates of 
saving achieved by those countries, the low importance of finite capital (minerals) in 
their economies and modest estimates of environmental damage arising from 
productive facilities that are of recent vintage and so incorporate modern pollution-
abating technology. In marked contrast, most oil-exporters as well as the hard mineral 
economies tend to record either low or negative genuine saving, which implies that they 
generate part of their wealth from consuming capital and that their development is not 
sustainable. The key policy implication from EARA is that many resource-rich 
governments need to shift resources away from consumption and towards investment 
to competitively diversify the economy away from reliance on the consumption of finite 
natural resources.  
 
 
6.  Managing the Global Pollution Sinks 
 
Evidence began to emerge in the 1980s to suggest that in market economies, the 
intensity with which energy and materials are used and the rate at which pollutants 
are emitted, first increases with per capita income and then declines (Bernstam 
1991). The resulting EKC, the ‘inverted U-shape’ curve, reflects: 
 
  changes in economic structure as countries first assemble the infrastructure of 
a modern economy and then spend an increasing share of income on 
services and 'weightless' knowledge activity; 
  changes in technology designed to alleviate environmental damage;  
  growing preference for a cleaner environment (World Bank 2000).  
 
A World Bank study (1992, 40) speculates that it may be possible to de-link GNP 
from natural resource use. It notes that, historically, reductions in the use intensity in 
market economies (but not centrally planned economies) have preceded the 
increase in government concern for the environment. Subsequent policies adopted 
to correct the market failure (which undervalued the environmental natural resources 
used to absorb pollutants) accelerate this process. They rely initially on command-12   
and-control measures but increasingly favour economic instruments, which achieve 
reductions at less cost to society. 
 
Consistent with the EKC, Grossman and Krueger (1995) report evidence of the 
decline in the pollution intensity of GDP at higher levels of per capita income. For 
example, the downturn in suspended particulate and SO2 emissions occurs around 
the per capita income level of $5,000 (measured in 1985 US dollars at purchasing 
power parity). This approximates to the average per capita income of countries like 
Malaysia and Mexico in the early 1990s. Other atmospheric pollutants, such as 
carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and nitrogen oxides appear to peak at somewhat 
higher per capita income levels. The turning point for water pollution also appears to 
occur later at between $8,500 and $11,500 per capita income. Over that range the 
levels of faecal coliform counts, dissolved oxygen, biochemical oxygen demand 
(BOD) and nitrate all begin to improve.  
 
Subsequent work, however, suggests that matters are less clear-cut (Harbaugh et al. 
2002). The inverted U-shape pattern is not universal: levels of toxic metals in rivers 
appear to fall steeply to around $5,000 per capita income before levelling out or 
rising slightly and then falling again at $14,000. Moreover, Stern et al. (1995) caution 
that whereas some emissions such as water pollutants, sulphur and nitrogen oxides 
appear to decline, others do not appear to do so, including carbon dioxide and solid 
waste. In addition, the combination of declining pollution intensity with increasing 
output and a higher fraction of the global population attaining mid income levels, 
suggests that aggregate global pollution may continue to rise for some decades yet. 
Consistent with this warning, Hettige et al. (2000) caution, with reference to water 
pollution, that although increasing per capita income is associated with declining 
pollution intensity, the very modest decline of the share of polluting industry in GDP 
at higher incomes combines with continued total GDP growth to hold aggregate 
pollution steady. 
 
Nevertheless, where the domestic political economy permits developing country 
governments to pursue coherent economic policies, technology allows them to abate 
pollution at far lower incomes than the advanced economies. In other words, there is 
scope to flatten the EKC. This is because the EKC is very much an artefact of the 
specific historical patterns of pollution abatement prior to the 1980s when it was 
conceived. For example, Reddy and Goldenberg (1990) describe the historical trend 
in the energy-intensity of GDP, which acts as a proxy for pollution-intensity. They 
show that whereas the UK, the first industrial nation, experienced a peak energy use 
of 1.03 tonnes of oil equivalent per $1,000 of GDP in 1880, Germany peaked at 80 
per cent of that level in 1920 and Japan at two-fifths of the UK level by 1940. Reddy 
and Goldenberg suggest the developing countries can match the Japanese level or 
even improve on it and further flatten the EKC.  
 
The main reasons why developing countries deviate from the ‘best practice’ or 
flattening EKC are related to the natural resource endowment. Syrquin and Chenery 
(1989) show how the natural resource endowment impacts on industrial structure. 
For instance, large countries industrialise earlier due to greater ability to capture 
economies of scale. They also tend to be more self-sufficient (autarkic) than small 
countries, partly due to their large domestic market but partly through fashionable 
structuralist policies that sought to curb import dependence. This preference slowed 13   
the adoption of resource-conserving technology: Bernstam (1991) reports that 
insulation from market-sensitive technology and inaccurate price signals arrest, or 
even reverse, the declining resource-intensity and pollution-intensity of GDP. This 
implies that a development strategy aligned with a country's resource endowment 
and using appropriate prices is a pre-requisite for improving the sustainability of its 
development.  
 
In addition, the World Bank (1994) recommends that developing countries embrace 
presumptive charges (price incentives) over command-and-control measures 
(government targets) for pollution abatement in order to conserve their scarce 
administrative resources. The charges are levied on emissions, assuming a given 
technology and ratio between production volume and emission level. Firms achieving 
cleaner production become eligible for a rebate. The presumptive charge facilitates 
pollution abatement at least cost, unlike command-and-control because the 
individual firm decides whether it is cheapest to pay the charge; to invest in 
equipment to curb emissions; or to sub-contract treatment to specialist firms (as in 
the case of waste water in export processing zones in Thailand, for example). 
Similarly, air-borne emissions could be reduced through presumptive charges and 
adoption of a rational price structure. For example, Thai fuel taxes were lower on 
domestic lignite and imported coal than on cleaner fuel oil and diesel. The re-
adjustment of taxes to remove the price distortion enhances the incentive both to 
conserve energy and to use cleaner fuels. 
 
The use of scarce administrative resources can also be optimised if charges are 
initially applied to the largest firms only, using data collected about the output 
volumes and treatment levels of such firms. For example, research from the 
Philippines suggests that around 100 large plants account for 60 per cent of 
pollution. In Thailand a charge of $500 per tonne of BOD was proposed for large 
producers, with rebates paid if firms demonstrate superior performance. The 
adoption of such a scheme should halve total BOD. Recognising the lack of trained 
personnel as a constraint, NGOs can be co-opted to assist in emission monitoring 
while the training of special environmental police can also help improve enforcement. 
 
The targeting of larger firms can also diffuse improved practice. For example, where 
large firms assemble supplies from small plants, the large firm can be made 
responsible for the presumed aggregate pollution and so acquire an incentive to 
encourage improved practice among its suppliers. Such a system appears to be 
especially suitable for dealing with hazardous waste in metal finishing and 
electronics, for example. Other measures to reduce emissions from small firms 
include making local authorities responsible for their emission levels and subsidising 
technical assistance for abatement reduction (World Bank 1993). 
 
It is sometimes argued that low-income countries assign lower priority to a clean 
environment than to poverty elimination and basic needs. However, this dichotomy is 
false because new industrialisers can turn their late start to advantage by providing 
price incentives to adopt the cleanest technology now. For example, given 
appropriate incentives, a country growing as fast as Indonesia in the 1980s would by 
2010 have 85 per cent of its manufacturing capacity with post-1990 vintage 
technology that would be pollution-abating (Brandon and Raman Kutty 1993). 
Moreover, there are strong incentives for firms to adopt pollution-abating technology. 14   
For example, Chinese firms can cut sulphur pollution for $3/tonne (compared with 
more than $100/tonne in the US where the earlier cheaper gains from abatement 
have been won), whereas the benefits in terms of lives saved and health 
improvement are at least twenty times this expenditure (Mani and Wheeler 1998). 
 
Concern that tighter pollution controls in industrial countries drive pollution-intensive 
industry to seek pollution havens in the developing countries appears unfounded. A test 
of the hypothesis that advanced countries export pollution is provided by comparing 
trends in the ratio of imports/exports for polluting industries (steel, non-ferrous metals, 
non-metallic minerals, pulp and paper, and industrial chemicals). A rate above one 
indicates greater dependence on imports of polluting industry than exports and is 
consistent with environmental dumping (the country is a net importer of ‘dirty’ products). 
In fact, the Japanese ratio did rise sharply after the early 1970s (i.e. the country began 
importing more 'dirty' products), but it turned down from a peak of 0.95 in the late 1980s 
so the country remained a net exporter of pollution-intensive products. Consistent with 
this, the ratio for the newly industrialising economies (NIEs) fell sharply from three to 
two between 1975 and 1981 (so these countries were moving towards being net 
exporters of ‘dirty’ products i.e. pollution havens) but then stabilised above two.   
Elsewhere, the lower-income developing Asian countries including China and SE Asia, 
lag the NIEs by a decade and also stabilise, in this case above three. The pattern of 
indices for North America and Latin America is similar and all three major OECD 
regions (North America, Japan and Western Europe) remain net exporters of pollution-
intensive products voiding the pollution haven hypothesis. In short, the pollution haven 
thesis had some credence until developing countries began to tighten regulations in the 
1980s. 
 
In fact, far from trade adversely affecting environmental conditions in the developing 
countries, Birdsall and Wheeler (1992) find it to be beneficial. Analysing Latin American 
pollution intensity during the years 1960-88, they find that growth in pollution intensity is 
lower the more open the trade policy and the higher the per capita income. Growth in 
pollution intensity ceased entirely in those open, fast-growth, high-income Latin 
American countries, which eschewed attempts to develop national technology via 
forced industrialisation in favour of investing in new plant with the latest pollution-
reducing technology. In addition, pressure from overseas customers in the OECD for 
more pollution-free products also stimulated abatement.   
 
The dumping of industrial pollution does not appear to be a significant factor in global 
industry location. A more important determinant of the pollution signature in developing 
countries is per capita income. As domestic markets grow and cross threshold sizes 
that permit competitive local production, new domestic industries emerge, moving from 
'early’ industry, like agro-processing and textiles, that tends to pollute water courses, 
through 'middle’ industry, like cement and chemicals, that has a greater impact on the 
atmosphere (a development reinforced by the concomitant growth in private transport), 
to 'late' industry, like metals and machinery, that principally impacts on hazardous solid 
waste. In other words, domestic demand is a more important factor than environmental 
dumping in driving the composition of manufacturing and levels of pollution in most 
developing countries (Auty 1997). 
 
In fact, low-income countries can increasingly benefit from industrial country efforts to 
abate pollution. In 2000, the World Bank established a $75 million floating fund to 15   
invest in pollution-abating technology, like renewable energy, in developing countries. 
The users of the fund derive carbon credits that can be sold to industrial country firms 
with high marginal costs of pollution abatement. A global market for carbon permits is 
rapidly emerging with prices ranging from around $15 to $30 per tonne as industrial 
country firms, that have already cut emissions substantially, find further cuts 
progressively more expensive than purchasing offsetting reductions in developing 
countries. To the extent that these carbon trades increase opportunities for developing 
country farmers and foresters, they boost per capita incomes in those countries while 
also increasing incentives for conservation. Yet another form of carbon sequestration 
involves injecting carbon emissions into suitable rock reservoirs that offer a cheaper 
way of curbing emissions (Herzog et al. 2000). Here again, markets can harness 
mutual self-interest to reduce reliance on political negotiation and moral suasion.  
 
 
7. Conclusions  and  Main  Policy Implications 
 
This paper starts from the optimistic assumption that the policies required for 
environmentally sustainable economic development are known but difficulties surround 
their implementation. Consequently, renewable resources continue to be mined, fund 
resources are depleted irresponsibly and the EKC flattens more slowly than it might 
with sounder policies. The paper argues that in the low-income countries differences in 
the natural resource endowment are an important and hitherto neglected cause of tardy 
environmental policy improvements. This is because the primary sector remains large 
relative to GDP in such countries so that the scale and socio-economic linkages 
generated by the natural resource rents condition the aims of governments in important 
ways. Most developing countries are resource-rich and natural resource abundance 
tends to foster predatory political states that use the rents to relax market discipline and 
buy political support, distorting their economies in the process so that competitive 
economic diversification falters and growth collapses. Recovery is protracted and may 
take generations to accomplish. Meanwhile, macro policy failure damages micro 
policies, including those aimed at environmental improvement, by distorting prices and 
incentives, depressing genuine saving rates and shortening time horizons to secure 
immediate survival.  
 
It is ironic that fears in the 1970s that shortages of natural resources might halt 
economic growth (Meadows et al. 1972) have given way to concern that the 
mismanagement of natural resource abundance intensifies environmental problems. 
Environmental policy makers and their advisers can benefit from a fuller awareness of 
how macro policy failure adversely impacts on environmental policies. They need to 
adapt environmental policies to the macroeconomic limitations and to recognise that 
some past policies may have failed because of those limitations rather than through 
systemic flaws in the policies themselves. They also need to be more supportive of 
the efforts of the IFIs to ease the constraint of maladroit macroeconomic 
management. The strengthening of sanctions against anti-social governance can 
help here. This will improve the design of sound environmental policies guided by total 
economic value to price in externalities, green accounting to achieve positive genuine 
saving, and cost-effective pollution abatement measures to flatten the EKC. In this way, 
developing countries can leapfrog the environmental learning curve of the advanced 
economies and limit the mismanagement of natural resources and minimise the 
damage to environmental services. 16   
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1,2       
  Large  4.7  10.56  7.34  3.22 
    Small  2.4 9.86 5.41 4.45 
Resource Rich      
  Large  1.9  12.65  5.83  6.86 
  Small, non-mineral  0.9  15.42  12.89  2.53 
  Small, hard mineral  -0.4  17.51  9.62  7.89 
  Small, oil exporter  -0.7  21.22  2.18  19.04 
All Countries    15.03 8.78 6.25 
1 Resource-poor = 1970 cropland/head  < 0.3 hectares 
2 Large = 1970 GDP > $7 billion  
 
Source: Derived from World Bank (2002) 
 
 
















Small non-mineral  
resource-rich 
        
   1960-73  14.8  4.2  3.5  1.6  2.6 
   1973-85  20.5  3.4  6.9  0.7  2.7 
   1985-97  21.9  3.5  6.0  0.9  2.6 
Small oil-exporting  
resource-rich 
        
   1960-73  24.5  6.6  3.7  4.0  2.6 
   1973-85  31.0  6.5  5.7  2.3  4.2 
   1985-97  23.9  1.9  12.4  -0.7  2.6 
Small ore-exporting 
resource-rich 
        
   1960-73  17.5  4.9  5.7  2.2  2.7 
   1973-85  21.8  3.0  7.3  0.1  2.9 
   1985-97  17.1  2.3  7.5  -0.4  2.7 
Large resource-rich           
   1960-73  20.3  5.4  4.0  2.7  2.7 
   1973-85  21.8  3.1  7.1  0.7  2.4 
   1985-97  20.1  4.0  5.0  1.9  2.1 
Small resource-poor           
   1960-73  18.8  6.1  3.2  3.5  2.6 
   1973-85  24.8  4.0  6.2  1.8  2.2 
   1985-97  23.0  4.4  5.2  2.4  2.0 
Large resource-poor           
   1960-73  17.7  5.0  4.2  2.4  2.6 
   1973-85  25.5  5.8  4.4  3.7  2.1 
   1985-97  26.3  6.0  4.4  4.7  1.3 
 
Source: Auty (2001)  21   
Table 3. Extended genuine saving rates, selected countries 1970-94 (% GNP) 
 
Country  1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89  1990-94
a) 
Newly  Industrialising       
    Argentina  16.85  18.07 4.35 6.39 5.02 
    India  7.96 8.78 5.91 7.75 8.31 
    Malaysia  17.31 17.61  9.08 10.43 15.21 
    South  Korea  11.13 20.60 20.69 30.33 30.53 
Mineral  Economies       
    Bolivia  6.10 -13.70 -43.77 -27.52 -13.97 
    Ghana  6.46  1.63  -10.94 -1.61 -1.94 
    Mexico  10.43 7.33  -4.22  -1.83 2.25 
  Saudi Arabia  -32.84  -23.51  -29.34  -21.74  -30.57 
Others       
    Bangladesh  -1.80 -2.37 -1.86 -0.16  0.64 
  Costa Rica  11.99  13.20  9.10  15.30  14.20 
    South  Africa  12.03 8.82 8.14 3.13 5.53 
Note: a) Costa Rica 1990-92, Saudi Arabia 1990-93 only 
 
Source: World Bank (2002).  
 
 